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Political Uncertainty and Firm Performance: Does
Shariah Compliance Matter?
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between political
uncertainty and the performance of Shariah compliant firms. This thesis will examine the
relationship between political instability and the performance of Shariah compliant versus
non-Shariah complaint firms. This relationship will be examined on two samples. The first
sample includes panel data of 12 emerged countries and 6 emerging countries, while the
second sample covers US data. Two measures of political instability will be used. The first
one is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index and the second one is elections
period. Two OLS models are implemented; both models provide evidence that Shariah
compliance has a positive significant effect on firms’ performance. The panel data provide
evidence that Shariah compliant firms perform better during periods of political instability.
However, presidential elections negatively affect performance of Shariah complaint firms in
the US.
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Chapter I
1. Introduction
Recently, Shariah compliant finance boomed globally; Islamic Finance assets grew from
US $ 200 billion up to US $ 1.8 trillion in the period from 2003 to 2013 (IMF, 2017).
Demand for Shariah-compliant indices has also increased worldwide. According to a study
by PwC (2011), Shariah-compliant indices reported an annual growth rate of 26 % for the
first ten years of this century. They were first introduced in 1960s; and since then hundreds of
Shariah Complaint Indices were launched all over the world to accommodate the interest in
Shariah Compliant Investment. Among the most famous Shariah complying indices are Dow
Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) and FTSE Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS).
Shariah compliant finance follows Shariah principles. Shariah prohibits investing in
certain activities including: alcohol, pork products, pornography, weapons, or gambling. In
addition, Shariah principles require that the risk of a transaction must be shared between the
borrower and the lender. Thus, Shariah complaint firm have specific financial characteristics
associated with leverage and liquidity1.
In recent years, many studies tried to capture the effect of Shariah compliance on
firms’ performance and whether the special financial characteristics of Shariah complaint
firms result in better performance or under performance in comparison to conventional firms.
In this thesis, the effect of political uncertainty on performance of Shariah firms and how it
differs in comparison to non -Shariah firms will be examined.
Political uncertainty (periods of political changes, significant events or unrest) affects
the performance of stock market. The reason is that those periods of uncertainty triggers
different investors’ behaviors. The magnitude of effect of such uncertainty is likely to differ
Shariah complaint firms must have a debt ratio < 33 %, cash ratio < 33% and receivables ratio < 49%, for
screening calculations refer to research methodology in chapter 3
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depending on other firm- specific and country-specific variables. Even though both Shariah
and non -Shariah firms are likely to be affected by political uncertainty; yet the effect will
vary due to the distinguished nature of Shariah compliant firms.
Shariah complaint firms cannot rely on debt in capital expenditure or in running
operation; thus, limiting sources of financing for new projects or growing the business.
However, Shariah complaint firms are likely to benefit from maintaining lower leverage
during periods of crisis/uncertainty; this is because a lower leverage level reduces risk of
bankruptcy and inability to pay debt.
Political instability affects the stock market; however, the effect varies from one firm
to another. Stock performance and volatility of returns depend on the type of industry and the
degree of exposure of a firm’s operation to threats associated with political uncertainty
(Beaulieu et. al.2005). Thus, excluding investment in volatile industries such as alcohol and
gambling is likely to positively impact performance of Shariah compliant firms during
periods of political or economic uncertainty/crisis (Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al.
(2014); Ho et al. (2014)). Other studies argue that there is no significant difference in
performance of Shariah vs. non-Shariah firms' performance (Hassan and Girard (2011);
Setiawan & Oktariza (2013)).
The contribution of this thesis is to add to the limited literature available on Shariah
compliant firms by investigating how political uncertainty/instability affects performance of
Shariah complaint firms in comparison to non-Shariah firms.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 2) Literature Review & Hypothesis
Development, 3) Data & Research Methodology, 4) Results and discussion and 5)
Conclusion and References.
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Chapter II
2. Literature Review &Hypothesis Development

2.1 Literature on Performance of Shariah vs. Non Shariah:
In this section, literature on performance of Shariah and non-Shariah firms will be
covered to identify the main arguments on how Shariah firms perform versus non-Shariah
firms; particularly whether there is a significant difference in their performance.

Shariah compliance directly affects firms’ fundamentals including type of business
activity, leverage level, riskiness and sources of financing. Shariah screening is tied to
transparency and efficiency in managing limited financial resources and thus adding value in
the long run.

Pepis and Jong (2019) applied a long-term event study approach using data for 28
years covering the period from 1990 to 2018 to investigate the effect of Shariah compliance
on long-term performance of firms. Return on asset (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) as well
as rebalanced annual stock returns were used to investigate the performance of shariah firms
versus a control group of non-shariah firms. The study concluded that in the long-term
shariah compliant firms resulted in higher ROA and ROS in comparison to the control group.
This suggests that reducing debt level and receivables to abide by shariah promotes efficient
management of resources and adds strategic value for firms in the long run.

Akguc & Al Rahahleh (2018) examined the relationship between shariah compliance
and operating performance. The study applied a multivariate regression model on data of
Shariah complaint and non-Shariah compliant firms in GCC area to investigate how
profitability is affected by Shariah compliance. The study concluded that complying with
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shariah adopted leverage and liquidity ratios results in higher profitability margins. This is
because Shariah-complaint firms have lower cost structure and debt and require efficient
management of assets and resources.

Setiawan & Oktariza (2013) investigated the relationship between risk and return for
Shariah and non-Shariah companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange using data from
2009 to 2011. They investigated the relationship between returns and firm-specific financial
ratios (Debt/ Equity Ratio, Earnings per share, Price Earnings Ratio, Net Profit Margin,
Return on Equity, and Price to book value) for both Shariah and non-Shariah companies.
Risk-adjusted returns measured by Sharpe Ratio, Treynor ratio and Jensen’s Alpha proved
that there is no significant difference between the performance of Shariah complaint and nonShariah complaint firms. In addition to that, their results proved that returns of both Shariah
and non-Shariah firms are significantly affected by Debt to Equity Ratio, Earnings per share
and Return on Equity.

Low leverage level is one of the main factors that distinguish shariah complaint firms
in terms of risk and return. High leveraged firms are more likely to experience a decline in
market value of equity in comparison to low leveraged firms during periods of downturn
(Opler and Titman, 1994). This indicates that shariah complaint firms provide a less risky
investment; which raises the concern about risk-return trade of shariah complaint firms versus
their counterparts.

Al-Zoubi and Magheyreh (2007) applied several Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodologies
to investigate the relative risk performance of Dow Jones Islamic Index versus its
conventional index. Using data to cover the period from 1996 to 2005, they concluded that
the Islamic index presented a less risky investment when compared to the conventional Dow
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Jones World Index. The authors concluded that the Shariah adopted profit and loss sharing
principle results in a significantly lower risk in comparison to the market.

To capture risk-return tradeoff between Shariah and non shariah complaint firms,
Albaity and Ahmad (2011) compared the returns and volatility of two Islamic indices and two
socially responsible indices listed in UK and US versus the performance of the conventional
indices. The study proved that there is no significant difference between the returns of any of
the indices, thus no risk premium is required for Islamic indices. The study also investigated
the sensitivity of the indices to news and concluded that bad news has a greater impact on all
indices in comparison to good news. This indicates that all markets are sensitive to bad news;
where markets become more volatile when stock prices decrease significantly. This is
primarily due to investors’ perception of higher level of risk as stock prices fall.

Colina and Gatti (2009) created a hypothetical Shariah compliant portfolio from listed
Italian companies and compared its performance to the benchmark. The study concluded that
the Shariah compliant portfolio beat the benchmark during periods of boom, growth and
crisis while it underperformed the benchmark during moderate periods. The plausible shariah
complaint index was mostly dominated by the well-established Italian retail and goods
sectors. Thus, the study proves that abiding by shariah financial rules do not contradict with
efficient stock picking strategies used by portfolio managers to create a well-diversified
portfolio.
Hussein and Omran (2005) compared the performance of the Islamic Index in Dow
Jones against the performance of Dow Jones World Index. The study applied CAPM,
Treynor ratio and Sharpe ratio while subdividing the data into three periods. The data was
subdivided into full period, bull period and bear period. During the full and bullish period, the
Shariah complying index was reported to outperform the conventional index. However, the
8

Islamic Index in Dow Jones underperformed Dow Jones World Index in bearish period.
According to the study the screening criteria adopted by Islamic Index in Dow Jones results
in excluding large global firms and thus the index comprises of smaller firms that are subject
to higher volatility of returns.

A more comprehensive study by Hassan and Girard (2011) used data of seven indexes
chosen from the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) to examine the performance of
Shariah versus non-Shariah complaint indexes using data from 1996 to 2005. The study
controlled for several factors: “market risk, size, book-to-market, momentum, local and
global factors”. They concluded that the variance in returns between Shariah and
conventional indices is not significant; where both the Shariah and conventional indexes have
similar reward to risk and diversification benefits. Moreover, the study concluded that shariah
screening resulted in investing in growth focused small-cap industries while conventional
indices include more value-focused industries of mid-cap size of higher environmental risk
such as energy and chemicals industries.
A study by Rejeb and Arfaoui (2019) applied a standard GARCH model to monthly
data of market returns of ten shariah indices and their counterparts during the period from
1996 to 2016. The period under study includes several financial events such as Brother
Lehman collapse, extreme market movements into 2008, GFC and the Eurozone crisis
(EZDC). The study proved that both conventional and Islamic indices are affected by the
financial crisis due to volatility spillover during subprime crisis. Nevertheless, shariah
complaint indices outperform conventional indices in terms of informational efficiency.
Other studies proved that Shariah complying firms outperform non-Shariah
complying firms in times of crisis (Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al. (2014); Ho et al.
(2014)). Jawadi et al. (2014) compared the performance of three Dow Jones Islamic Indices
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(World, USA and Europe) to the performance of their benchmarks before and after the
subprime crisis. The study concluded that even though both Islamic and conventional indices
were affected by the crisis, however the Islamic index performed better during the downturn.
Al-Khazali et al. (2014) reached the same conclusion by applying stochastic dominance
(SD) analysis to nine Dow Jones Islamic Indexes and their benchmark and comparing their
performance during the global financial crisis in 2007 to 2012. According to Farooq and
Alahkam’s (2016) findings, Shariah firms perform better during crisis due to their
distinguished financial characteristics of low leverage and low account receivables. Such
financial characteristics reduce their vulnerability to bankruptcy and failure to collect
receivables from customers during periods of crisis.
A study by Miniaoui et.al (2015) sheds the light on performance of shariah complaint
indices and conventional indices in GCC countries during 2008 financial crisis. They applied
GARCH model to six GCC markets (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar)
to investigate the effect of the financial crisis on volatility of returns across shariah complaint
indices and conventional indices. The study concluded that the effect of the financial crisis on
Shariah complaint indices differed across GCC countries. Risk affected volatility of Shariah
indexes and their counterparts in three countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar); while no
significant affect was captured on volatility of returns for the rest of the countries. The study
concluded that the effect of the financial crisis on volatility of returns varied across GCC
countries regardless of Shariah compliance. Thus, implying that both shariah and non-shariah
indices in GCC countries are subject to similar risk.
Touiti and Henchiri (2016) investigated the behavior and market efficiency of twenty
Shariah complaint indices from Dow Jones family and their conventional counterparts during
subprime crisis. They attempted to capture the effect of the crisis on performance of indices
using risk-adjusted return measurements (Sharpe ratio (SR), Treynor index (TI) and Jensen's
10

alpha). They concluded that Islamic indices are vulnerable to crisis; both Islamic and
conventional indices recorded higher volatility and lower returns during subprime crisis.
Nevertheless, four Islamic indices outperformed their counterparts in period of crisis in terms
of returns. Mixed results about performance of Shariah complaint indices during crisis are in
line with the study by Hassan and Girard (2010).

Albaity and Ahmad (2011) conducted a comparative study to investigate the difference in
returns and volatility between three Islamic indices listed in USA, United Kingdom and
Malaysia. They applied a Generalized ARCH-GARH model (GARCH-M) for daily data
covering 8 years. The study concluded that there is no significant difference in the returns of
the three indices. The study reported leverage effect for the two indices listed in USA and
United Kingdom, but no leverage effect was reported for the index listed in Malaysia. The
paper argues that this is due to larger market capitalization of the US and UK indices in
comparison to the Malaysia Index.
2.2 Literature on Political Risk, Stock Returns

This section highlights the findings of several studies that investigated how political
instability affects firms’ performance. Political Instability creates an uncertain environment;
which triggers different investors’ behaviors depending on their perception on how different
financial investments would behave during uncertainty.

The degree by which political

instability impacts firms’ performance during periods of uncertainty is directly linked to firm
specific characteristics and operational activity.

Sun and Liu (2018) used the five components of the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) Rating model: Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Profile,
Internal Conflict and External Conflict, to investigate how political risk affect volatility of
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stock returns. The study included data from China, United Kingdom, Mexico and Iran and
applied a GARCH (1,1) model. Government Stability and socioeconomic conditions were
reported to have significant impact on stock returns and volatility on all countries; as
government instability and unstable economic conditions might result in change in laws and
rules thus causing uncertainty about future performance of different industries. The study
concluded that developing countries are more vulnerable to political risks in comparison to
developed countries due to higher level of challenges encountered by developing countries
and more critical political decisions, which could reshape the business environment. Similar
results were obtained by Vortelinos and Saha (2016) who used monthly data of 66 countries
for 13 years to investigate the effect of political risk on stock returns and volatility.
Vortelinos and Saha (2016) applied an Ordinary Least Squared method using twenty political
indicators extracted from The ICRG Index as proxy for political instability. Inflation rate,
stock market capitalization, Gross Domestic Product, trade integration and interest rate were
used as control variables to run the regression. The study proved that the effect of political
risk on returns and volatility differs depending on country of operation; due to the effect of
socioeconomic conditions in shaping the perception of investors about the level of risk
associated with political events and required returns.

Malik et al. (2009) investigated the effect of major political events on performance of
stocks listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. The study applied Phillips Person unit root test to
investigate how trading volume and returns were affected by resignation of President Pervaiz
Musharraf. They reported high fluctuations in trading volumes and stock returns due to high
volatility of stock prices during intense political events. This is because intense political
events confuse the market participants and their perception about risk aversion resulting in
increase in short selling and traded volumes.
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Beaulieu et al. (2005) investigated the effect of political risk on volatility of stock
returns of firms listed on the Canadian Stock Exchange using data from 1990 to 1996. The
study applied a GARCH model to investigate how news related to Quebec's independence
from Canada affected the volatility of returns. The study concluded that the volatility of
returns is highly associated to the extent of firms’ exposure to political risk, where firms that
operate internationally or have high potential for growth are less affected by negative news.
Locally operating firms with high assets in place were reported to have higher volatility of
returns, due to difficulty of relocating.
Chau et.al (2014) used data of conventional and Islamic indices in MENA region to
investigate how political uncertainty arising from Arab Spring affected stock market
volatility. The study applied several asymmetric GARCH models to measure volatility of
conventional and Islamic indexes in 6 MENA countries. The study concluded that political
instability results into high volatility of returns due to reduced business confidence and
investors perception about up rises and protests as an increased risk in the market. According
to the study, both conventional and Islamic indices were affected by political instability;
however Islamic indices were more volatile. This is because Islamic indices in the MENA
region invest heavily in oil and gas industries; which are more vulnerable to political turmoil.
Ahmed (2018) applied a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework to
investigate the effect of political instability on Shariah compliant and conventional indices in
developing and developed countries. ICRG index was used to investigate how the level of
political risk affects prices of MSCI Islamic stock market indices and its conventional
counterpart over the period from 2005 to 2016. The study proved that shariah complaint
indices are less sensitive to political uncertainty in developed countries than their
counterparts, which could be attributed to nature of industries that shariah complaint indices
invest in. In developing countries, both shariah and non-shariah complaint indices were
13

significantly affected by political uncertainty; as political instability in weaker economies is
accompanied by reduced country credit ratings thus increasing required equity premium in
the market. The study concluded that political uncertainty induces higher risk environment to
equity market and increases required equity risk premium by investors; both shariah and noncomplaint firms are not immune to this unsuspected risk.
According to above literature, political instability triggers uncertainty. Nevertheless, the
effect of this uncertainty on firm’s performance is correlated to firm specific characteristics
and country specific characteristics; we build our first hypothesis:
H01: Shariah compliant firms perform better during political instability
2.3 Literature on Elections and Stock Performance
Several studies investigated the effect of elections on stock returns and volatility.
Elections are usually accompanied by uncertainty about future policies and laws adopted by
new governments; causing a disturbance in the stock market.
Chien et.al (2014) applied an ordinary least square model to investigate the
relationship between DJI returns as proxy of market returns and US presidential elections
using data of 27 presidential elections. The study provided evidence that stock market returns
are affected by elections; as movement in returns following elections period reflects investors'
perception about the future of economy under the new ruling government. Hence, market
returns will increase in case investors are optimism and confident in the new government and
decreases incase investors are pessimistic about the changes to be implemented by the new
ruling government.
Bouoiyour and Selmi (2017) applied an event study methodology to investigate the
effect of political uncertainty associated with presidential elections on stock returns. The
study concluded that different industries react differently to political uncertainty; depending
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on the announced presidential campaign. Industries that are expected to benefit from new
rules and changes in laws witnessed an increase in returns post-election announcement while
industries expected to be negatively impacted by new rules and regulations witnessed a drop
in returns.
Bialkowski et.al. (2006) investigated the effect of national elections on stock market
volatility using data of 27 OECD countries. They applied a volatility event-study approach
using a GARCH Model and concluded that index return variance elevates significantly in
elections week due to uncertainty of election results changes that would occur in the business
environment depending on the new ruling government.
Boutchkova et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between political stability and
stock market volatility across different industries. A regression model was run using panel
data, where the independent variable is the industry volatility. Several independent variables
were used to control for political factors including ICRG index as proxy for political risk,
autocracy level and dummy variable for national elections. The study proved that the effect of
political instability varies across industries, as volatility of returns increases for more
politically sensitive industries in comparison to other industries. Politically sensitive
industries include trade dependent and labor-intensive industries. Local political risks were
reported to affect industries that are labor intensive and trade dependent due to risk associated
with new stricter labor laws. Nevertheless, industries with international trade exposures are
affected by political risks in countries of trading partners due to raised concerns about
changes in macroeconomics policies by newly elected governments.
Goodell and Bodey (2012) investigated the changes in Price to earnings (P/E) ratios
during six US presidential election cycles; providing evidence that P/E ratios decrease as
results of elections becomes more predictable. This is due to decrease in volatility and in
uncertainty about future growth and risk.
15

Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) investigated the effect of US presidential elections on
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options; using VIX implied volatility index. A linear
regression model was applied to investigate how market perception about the winner of
elections will affect volatility; using the change in market prices of Iowa Electronic Markets
(IEMs) over five election periods as proxy for market opinion. IEMs are presidential future
contracts; with the payoff based on the election outcome. The study showed evidence that a
strong positive relationship exists between implied volatility and market expectations about
whether the expected winner will result in macroeconomic policy changes.
Based on above literature, national elections are accompanied by uncertainty, which affects
performance of all firms’ and stock market. However, different industries react differently
depending on the nature of each industry and how investors interpret the effect of new laws
and regulations on different business sectors.
We build our second hypothesis:
H02: National elections affect performance of shariah complaint and non- shariah complaint
firms
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Chapter III
3. Data and Research Methodology
This chapter discusses data used and research methodology applied to investigate the effect
of political instability on firms' performance. This study uses panel data of 12 developed and
6 developing countries from 2010-20172 to investigate the effect of political instability on
firms' performance. Section 3.1 discusses the data used and sources of data. Section 3.2
includes summary statistics of the data used. Finally, Section 3.3 explains the methodology
used to identify Shariah complaint firms, the model implemented and chosen variables.

3.1 Data
Financial performance: financial performance is measured by two variables; Tobin’s Q
(Total market value of firm divided by total book value of firm) and Adjusted market returns
(Calculated as the return of a given company minus the relevant index return representing a
given market.). The two variables are obtained from DataStream.
Political instability: The study uses the political index of The International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) by PRS group as a measurement of political stability3. This political index is
used by previous literature 4 as proxy of political instability; where a risk rating of a country
is determined based on 12 risk components. A country score is collected out of 100 points
(maximum 100 and minimum 0) based on the total score received in the twelve components;
below table explains the 12 components and the fixed weight of each:

2

Twelve emerged countries (Netherlands, Australia, France, Canada, United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland, USA,
Spain, Sweden, Hong Kong, Singapore) and six emerging countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Russia, Greece,
Mexico)
3

The ICRG is a researcher data set released by the political risk services group, comprising of 22 variables that
rate political, financial and economic risks for 146 countries, a separate risk rating index is available for each of
the three categories. This paper uses the annual averages political risk rating dataset available on PRS website as
proxy of political risk.
4
See previous work of Boutchkova et al. (2011) , Vortelinos and Saha (2016) and Sun and Liu (2018)
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Component
Government Stability
Socioeconomic Conditions
Investment Profile
Internal Conflict
External Conflict
Corruption
Military in Politics
Religious Tensions
Law and Order
Ethnic Tensions
Democratic Accountability
Bureaucracy Quality

Component Points (max.)
12
12
12
12
12
6
6
6
6
6
6
4

Table (1): ICRG Political index components, Source: PRS International Country Risk
Guide

Several control variables are used including firms’ specific variables and country
level variables; obtained from DataStream. Country-level variables include GDP, inflation
rate and interest rate as proxy for macroeconomic conditions. Those variables are chosen
based on previous literature conducted to investigate the effect of political instability on
performance including the work of Vortelinos and Saha (2016); Beaulieu et al. (2005) and
Hassan and Girard (2011). Firms’ specific variables include size, asset growth, dividend
payout and earning per share as proxy for firm financial characteristics. Table (2) below
explains how control variables are calculated:
Control Variable

Definition

Size

Natural logarithm of total assets is use as proxy for size

Asset growth

Represents asset growth rate in comparison to previous year; calculated as
(current year's total assets / last year's total assets - 1) * 100

EPS

Earning per share; represents how much the company makes for each share
of its stocks; calculated as (net income of the company - dividend on
preferred stocks) / weighted average number of shares outstanding

Dividend payout

Calculated as dividends per share / earnings per share * 100

GDP

Gross Domestic Product is the total production of goods and service across
a country within any given year.

Inflation

The consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for inflation

Table (2): Control variables

18

3.2 Summary statistics
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table (3)
Descriptive Statistics (2010-2017)
Mean

Log Tobin’s Q

Median Maximum Minimum

2.000000

-4.045714 0.460895

47111

0.020420 -0.028717 3.508341

-1.644039 0.496262

47111

79.96100 81.41667

88.58333

55.75000

6.191272

47111

Size

5.109126 5.191525

10.26781

-0.080748 1.314030

47111

EPS

-0.265570 0.028000

450.4000

-1234.459 24.71168

47111

Dividend payout

17.71449 0.000000

100.0000

0.000000

25.76655

47111

Asset Growth

16.95316 4.860000

994.4200

-99.39000 71.65494

47111

GDP

2.377640 2.400000

25.10000

-9.200000 1.801430

47111

Inflation

2.159901 1.900000

15.50000

-1.700000 1.662902

47111

Interest rate

5.162410 4.200000

52.10000

1.300000

47111

Adjusted returns

0.233310 0.219232

St.Dev. No.of Obs

Political Stability Variable

ICRG
Firm Specific Variables

Country Level Variables

5.764616

Source: Author’s calculations
Table (3) shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. It shows the mean, median,
maximum, minimum, standard deviation and number of observation. The mean for log
Tobin’s Q is 0.233 with a maximum of 2 and minimum of -4.04 and a standard deviation of
0.46. The average for adjusted returns is 0.02 with a maximum of 3.5 and a minimum of -1.6
and a standard deviation of 0.49. ICRG has mean of 79.96 with a maximum of 88.5 and a
19

minimum of 55.75 and a standard deviation of 6.19. The mean for size is 5.1 with a
maximum of 10.2 and minimum of -0.08. EPS has mean of -0.2 with a maximum of 450.4
and a minimum of -1234.4. Dividend payout has a mean of 17.7 with a maximum of 100 and
minimum of zero. The mean for asset growth is 16.9 with a maximum of 994.4 and a
minimum of -99.3. For GDP the mean is 2.3 with a maximum of 25.1 and a minimum of -9.2.
Inflation has a mean of 2.15 with a maximum of 15.5 and a minimum of -1.7. The mean for
interest rates 5.16 with a maximum of 52.1 and a minimum of 1.3.
3.2.2 Correlation Matrix
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for the sample. There is a positive correlation between
adjusted returns and log Tobin’s Q, GDP, inflation, size, EPS, dividend payout and asset
growth; while there is a negative correlation between adjusted returns and ICRG and interest
rates. There is a positive correlation between log of Tobin’s Q and ICRG, GDP, EPS,
Dividend payout and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between log of
Tobin’s Q and inflation, interest rates and size. There is a positive correlation between ICRG
and GDP and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between ICRG and inflation,
interest rates, size, EPS and dividend payout. There is a positive correlation between GDP
and size, dividend payout and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between
GDP and inflation, interest rates and EPS. There is a positive correlation between Inflation
and interest rates, size, EPS, dividend payout and asset growth. There is a positive correlation
between Interest rates and size and dividend payout. While there is a negative correlation
between interest rates and EPS and asset growth. There is a positive correlation between size
and EPS and dividend payout. While there is a negative correlation between size and asset
growth. There is a positive correlation between EPS and dividend payout and asset growth.
There is a negative correlation between dividend payout and asset growth.
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3.2.3 Multicollinearity test
The variance inflation factor (VIF) test was conducted to check for presence of
multicollinearity between the x-variables (Shariah, ICRG, GDP, Inflation, Interest rate, Size,
Asset growth, Dividend payout and EPS). As per test results reported in Appendix (1), the
reported magnitude of multicollinearity is within the tolerance level of VIF below 5. Thus,
indicating absence of multicollineratiy between the x-variables chosen to run the regression
model.
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Table (4): Correlation matrix
Adjusted
returns

Corr.

Log
(Tobin’s Q)

ICRG

GDP

Inflation

Interest rate

Size

EPS

Dividend Payout Asset growth

Adjusted returns

1.000000

Log (Tobin’s Q)

0.251994

1.000000

ICRG

-0.014290

0.136547

1.000000

GDP

0.113795

0.008621

0.286125

1.000000

Inflation

0.036709

-0.114096

-0.428119

-0.007465

1.000000

Interest rate

-0.003090

-0.087472

-0.464830

-0.097606

0.511500

1.000000

Size

0.056314

-0.087280

-0.221600

0.024501

0.111312

0.115250

1.000000

EPS

0.050386

0.007595

-0.034205

-0.008208

0.001561

-0.006812

0.057732

Dividend Payout

0.098316

0.088510

-0.098852

0.039090

0.044258

0.082466

0.305217 0.050264

1000000

Asset growth

0.170820

0.129851

0.056237

0.037097

0.005814

-0.011306

-0.050551 0.001597

-0.061659

Source: Author’s calculations

1000000

1.000000

3.3 Research Methodology
3.3.1 Shariah compliance screening methodology
This study applies S&P shariah screening methodology on panel data of the selected 18
countries. According to S&P methodology, shariah complaint firms exclude several business
sectors including: gambling, tobacco, alcohol, weapons, pork, casinos and entertainment,
gambling, pornography and financial sector (with the exception of Islamic banks); firms
involved in those activities were identified as non-shariah firms.
The second step is to calculate leverage compliance and cash compliance; where shariah
complaint firms must abide to below ratios:
Cash compliance


Accounts Receivables / Market value of Equity (36-month average) < 49 %



(Cash + Interest Bearing Securities) / Market value of Equity (36-month average) <
33%

Leverage compliance:


Debt / Market Value of Equity (36-month average) < 33 %

Firms that passed the two screening criteria was labeled as shariah complaint using a
dummy variable (Shariah complaint=1, non-shariah complaint=0)
3.3.2 Model
The study uses two multiple regression models to investigate the effect of political instability
on firms' performance. The first model uses ICRG index as proxy of political instability and
applies an ordinary least square model to panel data of 12 developed and 6 developing
countries from 2010 to 2017.

The second model investigates how uncertainty associated with national elections
affects firms' perform using US data from 2010-2018; where a dummy variable is used to
identify election years (election year=1, non-election year = 0)
Fixed parameters for cross-section and period are used, which refers to a statistical model
where the mean for each control variable is fixed rather than taking the means as a random
sample from the population. We estimate the fixed estimator through running an Ordinary
Least Squares regression in which we have a constant standard deviation for the control
variables.
OLS Model 1: ICRG and firms’ performance
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏′ 𝒔 𝑸)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
(𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟

OLS Model 2: Elections and Performance (based on US data)
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏′ 𝒔 𝑸)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
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Chapter IV
4. Results
4.1 Results of OLS Model 1: ICRG and firms’ performance
Regression results of the first model are presentenced in Table (5) below. The results
provide evidence that financial performance as measured by (Adjusted market returns) and
(log Tobin’s Q) is positively affected by political stability (as measured by ICRG) and shariah
compliance as measured by (Shariah_ dummy). Moreover, (Cross Effect _ICRG _Shariah) is
reported to have a negative significant relationship with firm’s performance, thus indicating
that shariah complaint firms outperform non- shariah compliant during periods of political
instability. This is aligned with previous work of Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al.
(2014); Ho et al. (2014) who provided evidence that Shariah complaint firms perform better
during periods of instability due to their operation in less volatile industries and reduced
vulnerability to bankruptcy in case of political turmoil. Thus, we accept our first hypothesis
that shariah compliant firms perform better during periods of uncertainty.
In terms of firm’s specific control variables, (Dividend_ payout) and (Asset_ growth)
are both reported to have a positive significant relationship with (Adjusted market returns)
and (log Tobin’s Q); implying that firms’ investment in assets and dividend payout policy
impact stock prices; and thus impacting stock returns and market perception of stock value.
This is justified since one of the main ways for companies to attract investors is high
dividends payout ratio, especially in bearish times when there is less growth opportunities for
investment so there is less need to retain earnings. Consequently, high dividend payout ratio
results in an increased demand on the stock of a company; thus driving its value
upwards. Moreover, constant asset growth can be linked to an increase in operating assets;
which is reflected in future growth opportunities. Consequently, promising future growth
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would drive the market value of a company upwards, leading to a higher market-to-book
value ratio (Tobin’s Q).
A significant negative effect of size on Adjusted market returns and log (Tobin’s Q) is
reported which could be attributed to the fact that the smaller the size of the company; the
more returns required by the market to invest in that company due to higher inherent risk. On
the other hand, larger firms are more established and less risky; hence they incur lower
required return by the market to invest in.
A significant positive relationship between (GDP) and (Adjusted market returns) was
reported which could be attributed to the fact that higher GDP levels for a given country is
associated with successful growing economies. Growing economies are characterized by a
successful micro-economy on the collective level, which means high performing companies
in the stock market. Hence, GDP growth and companies returns are positively correlated.
This is in-line with the theory that the long-term GDP growth rate can be taken as a proxy for
the long-term market growth. Moreover, referring to the demand side of the GDP equation,
higher GDP indicates higher business spending or investments or government spending,
which usually means more resources available to be invested in capital markets. Hence,
capturing potential growth opportunities and high business growth; thus higher returns.
In terms of country specific macroeconomic control variables, (Inflation) and
(Interest_ rate) were reported to a significant negative relationship with firm’s performance.
When inflation increases, costs and expenses of companies increase. However, companies
cannot fully pass this increase to consumers resulting in smaller profit margins and less
expansionary capital investments. Thus, companies are limited in capturing future growth
opportunities, which negatively impact their market value.
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Table (5)
Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.095975*
1.312007***
(0.124350)
(0.066776)

Shariah_ dummy

0.168451**
(0.089236)

0.228418***
(0.048854)

ICRG

0.002822**
(0.001485)

0.003721***
(0.000740)

Cross Effect _ICRG _Shariah

-0.002137**
(0.001102)

-0.001500**
(0.000604)

Size

-0.066423***
(0.008075)

-0.284023***
(0.006192)

GDP

0.017992***
(0.001853)

0.010559***
(0.000901)

Dividend _ payout

0.000718***
(0.000177)

0.001024***
(9.41E-05)

Asset _growth

0.001178***
(3.14E-05)

0.000432***
(1.92E-05)

Inflation

-0.009301***
(0.002459)

-0.011727***
(0.001073)

EPS

2.95E-05
(8.71E-05)

8.47E-05
(6.93E-05)

-0.008865***
(0.001612)

-0.000944*
(0.000889)

52178
0.361056
0.210819

48111
0.778362
0.723677

Interest_ rate

Observations
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝛽10 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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4.2 Results of OLS Model 2: Elections and firms’ performance
Results of the second regression model based on US data and political elections as a measure
of political uncertainty are reported in Table (6) below. According to the results, financial
performance as measured by (Log Tobin’s Q) is positively affected by shariah compliance as
measured by (Shariah _dummy); indicating that the US shariah - compliant firms are
characterized by better performance. Moreover, the regression provides evidence that US
national elections as measured by (Elections _dummy) has a significant negative effect on
firms’ performance. This is aligned with previous work of Chien et.al (2014); Sun and Liu
(2018); Bialkowski et.al (2006); providing evidence that uncertainty surrounding elections
negatively affects firms’ performance due to ambiguity surrounding the new government and
possible changes in the business environment.
Based on a second regression run reported in Table (7) below, performance of Shariah
complaint firms is negatively affected by national elections in the US; where (Cross Effect_
Elections_ Shariah) is reported to be significantly negative. This implies that non-shariah
firms perform better during the US national elections; which could be attributed to perception
of investors about potential negative changes related to the shariah complaint business sectors
in the US.
Based on our dataset, the US Shariah complaint firms are mostly associated with
Healthcare, Technology and Industrial sectors5. Accordingly, regression is re-run three cross
effect variables to investigate the effect of elections on healthcare, technology and industrial
sectors. Results of the regression reported in Table (8) provide evidence that healthcare,
technology and industrial sectors are significantly negatively affected by presidential
5

Classification of sectors is based on DataStream classification, which classifies business sectors into main
sectors: Basic materials, Consumer cyclical, Consumer non-cyclical, Energy, Healthcare, Industrial, Technology,
Telecommunications and Utilities.
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elections as measured by (Cross Effect_ Elections_ Healthcare), (Cross Effect_ Elections
_Technology) and (Cross Effect _Elections _Industrial) respectively. This is in line with
previous work of Bouoiyour and Selmi (2017); Boutchkova et al. (2011) who provide
evidence that the effect of elections varies across industries; depending on whether a specific
industry is expected to benefit from the agenda of the new president or otherwise.
As for the control variables, (Dividend_ payout) and (Asset_ growth) are reported to
have a significant positive relationship with (log Tobin’s Q); while (Size) and (inflation) are
reported to have a significant negative effect on (log Tobin’s Q). This is in line with results of
the first model including the full dataset.
(GDP) is reported to have a negative significant relationship with firm’s performance,
which is different than the results obtained by the first model of the full dataset, which could
be attributed to risk characteristics of US during presidential elections.
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Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)

Table (6)
Constant

1.557634***
(0.073654)

Shariah_ dummy

0.034667***
(0.006600)

GDP

-0.022935***
(0.005633)

Inflation

-0.033295***
(0.003168)

Asset Growth

0.000446***
(5.07E-05)

Dividend Payout

0.001026***
(0.000214)

Size

-0.189529***
(0.012599)

Elections_ dummy

-0.012712**
(0.006998)

Observations
12301
R-squared
0.762043
Adjusted R-squared
0.715590
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 _ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 _ 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟

where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)

Table (7)
Constant

1.535898***
(0.072043)

Shariah_ dummy

0.043329***
(0.005549)

Asset Growth

0.000446***
(5.07E-05)

Size

-0.188056***
(0.012569)

Dividend Payout

0.001023***
(0.000214)

GDP

-0.020339***
(0.004924)

Inflation

-0.031940***
(0.003028)

Cross Effect_ Elections_ Shariah

-0.075313***
(0.016090)

Observations
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

12301
0.762473
0.716103

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽5 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟

where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
1.562634***
(0.073014)

Table (8)
Constant

Inflation

-0.033192***
(0.003101)

Dividend_ payout

0.001019***
(0.000214)

Size

-0.190600***
(0.012606)

EPS

-0.000137
(0.000105)

GDP

-0.022460***
(0.005268)

Asset_ growth

0.000448***
(5.08E-05)

Shariah_ dummy

0.033870***
(0.006193)

Cross Effect_ Elections_ Healthcare

-0.025190**
(0.013143)

Cross Effect_ Elections _ Industrial

-0.010231*
(0.012670)

Cross Effect_ Elections _Technology

-0.025983**
(0.012635)

Observations
12301
R-squared
0.762171
Adjusted R-squared
0.715659
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 _ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 _𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 _ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦
+ 𝛽11 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was log (Tobin’s Q)
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted for regression model 1. As per results reported in
Table (9) to Table (17) in Appendix (2), the first run provided evidence that a significant
positive relationship exist between (Shariah_ dummy) and the two dependent variables (Log
Tobin’s Q and Adjusted market returns), which is in line with the results of our regression.
The regression was then re- run after adding ICRG variable, which confirmed the presence of
significant positive relationship between political stability and firms’ performance. Each of
the control variables was added gradually and the regression was rerun. Results of the several
runs conducted confirmed the presence of a negative significant relationship between (Cross
Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah) and the two independent variables and a positive significant
relationship between the control variables (GDP, Asset growth and Dividend _ payout) and
the two dependent variables. Moreover, results confirmed the presence of a significant
negative relationship between the two control variables (Inflation and Interest_ rate) and the
two independent variables.
A second sensitivity analysis was conducted for the US model. Results reported in Table
(18) to Table (24) in Appendix (3) confirm the presence of a significant negative relationship
between elections and firms’ performance and a significant negative relationship between
(Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah) and firms’ performance. Moreover, results of the runs
confirms the presence of a significant positive relationship between two control variables
(Asset growth and Dividend _ payout) and firms’ performance and the presence of a
significant negative relationship between three control variables (Inflation, GDP, Size) and
firms’ performance.
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CHAPTER V
5. Conclusion
This thesis aims to shed the light on performance of Shariah firms versus non-Shariah
firms and how it’s affected by political uncertainty. Literature covering performance of
shariah complaint equities and political risk is covered in depth in Chapter I of this thesis.
Following previous studies, two measures of political uncertainty are chosen: the political
index ICRG by PRS group and national elections period. The political index ICRG is used
extensively in literature as a political risk rating. Moreover, national elections is considered a
period of uncertainty due to its high impact on future of business environment; thus it allows
for capturing the effect of uncertainty on firm’s performance.
Data of listed Shariah and non-Shariah firms is collected from 18 countries during the
period (2010-2018) to investigate how different political uncertainties affect performance.
Two OLS regression models are run; where the first model includes the full panel dataset for
the period 2010-2017 to investigate the effect of political stability as measured by ICRG
index on firms’ performance. The second model is run using a US dataset to investigate how
national elections in the United States during the period 2010-2018 affected firms’
performance.
Results of the first model and second model are discussed in Chapter III. The first
model provides evidence that shariah compliance is positively related to firms’ performance
during periods of political instability. This could be attributed to their specific financial
characteristics and their operation in less volatile industries. The second model provides
evidence that shariah compliance is associated with better performance in the US; however
shariah compliant firms are negatively affected by national elections. Firms’ performance
during election years is tied to expected changes in the business environment. Hence,
performance of industries expected to benefit from the agenda of the newly elected president
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is positively affected by elections, while industries expected to be penalized from new rules
or regulations are negatively affected.
This thesis provides a better understanding of how Shariah compliance affects
performance, specifically during periods of uncertainties, which allow investors interested in
shariah complaint equities to manage investments efficiently and reduce risks.
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Appendix (1)
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test:
Results of VIF test provide evidence that no multicollineratiy exist between any of the xvariables; as VIF was reported to be within the acceptable tolerance level (below 5) for all xvariables.

Variable

R- squared

VIF

Shariah_ dummy

0.033206

1.03434651

ICRG

0.361547

1.566286007

GDP

0.100889

1.112209727

Inflation

0.327666

1.487355987

Interest_ rate

0.353225

1.546132735

EPS

0.00458

1.004601073

Dividend payout

0.024909

1.025545308

Asset growth

0.005866

1.005900613
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Appendix 2

Table (9)
Constant

Shariah_ dummy

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.013123***
0.169348***
(0.003548)
(0.001961)
0.038024***
(0.005836)

Observations

66894

0.126555***
(0.126555)
61148

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +Error
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.

Table (10)

Constant

Shariah_ dummy

ICRG

Observations

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.747242***
-0.404564***
(0.094273)
(0.049823)
0.059857***
(0.006422)

0.125387***
(0.003476)

0.008760***
(0.001172)

0.007158***
(0.000621)

59247

54146

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.

40

Table (11)

Constant

Shariah_dummy

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.798253***
-0.487567***
(0.101069)
(0.053442)
0.184112**
(0.088992)

0.325857***
(0.046882)

ICRG

0.009399***
(0.001258)

0.008200***
(0.000666)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

-0.001535 *
(0.001097)

-0.002483***
(0.000579)

Observations

59247

54146

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Table (12)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.368190***
-0.182923***
(0.110218)
(0.056485)

Shariah_dummy

0.244901***
(0.083306)

0.286501***
(0.046806)

ICRG

0.003795***
(0.001389)

0.004017***
(0.000713)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

-0.003137 ***
(0.001027)

-0.002063***
(0.000578)

GDP

0.023959***
(0.001675)

0.013973***
(0.000860)

Observations

59247
54146
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Table (13)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.325148***
-0.143825**
(0.110540)
(0.056730)

Shariah_dummy

0.237879***
(0.083298)

0.286840***
(0.046780)

ICRG

0.003637***
(0.001389)

0.003745***
(0.000713)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

-0.003063 ***
(0.001027)

-0.002070***
(0.000578)

0.021410***
(0.001754)

0.013158***
(0.000867)

-0.011215***
(0.002283)

-0.007116***
(0.001016)

GDP

Inflation

Observations

59247

54146

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)

Table (14)

Constant

-0.200164**
(0.112282)

-0.135502**
(0.057183)

Shariah_ dummy

0.199894**
(0.083486)

0.283274***
(0.046882)

ICRG

0.002678**
(0.001397)

0.003703***
(0.000714)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

-0.002596 **
(0.001029)

-0.002026***
(0.000579)

0.019820***
(0.001771)

0.013006***
(0.000877)

Inflation

-0.009386***
(0.002301)

-0.006934***
(0.001029)

Interest_ rate

-0.009399***
(0.001500)

-0.000969*
(0.000837)

GDP

Observations

59247
54146
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Table (15)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.200164**
-0.135502**
(0.112282)
(0.057183)

Shariah_dummy

0.199894**
(0.083486)

0.283274***
(0.046882)

ICRG

0.002678**
(0.001397)

0.003703***
(0.000714)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

-0.002596 **
(0.001029)

-0.002026***
(0.000579)

0.019820***
(0.001771)

0.013006***
(0.000877)

Inflation

-0.009386***
(0.002301)

-0.006934***
(0.001029)

Interest_ rate

-0.009399***
(0.001500)

-0.000969*
(0.000837)

GDP

Observations

59247
54146
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Table (16)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.160290*
-0.141961**
(0.110547)
(0.057028)

Shariah_ dummy

0.187051**
(0.082287)

0.288570***
(0.046816)

ICRG

0.001982*
(0.001376)

0.003744***
(0.000712)

-0.002276 **
(0.001014)

-0.002064***
(0.000578)

0.018565***
(0.001741)

0.012457***
(0.000875)

Inflation

-0.009647***
(0.002269)

-0.007337***
(0.001027)

Interest_ rate

-0.009399***
(0.001472)

-0.001108*
(0.000832)

Asset_ growth

0.001114***
(2.82E-05)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

GDP

Observations

0.000228***
(1.79E-05)

58178
53709
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +
𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ+ E𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Table (17)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
(2)
Adjusted market returns
Log (Tobin’s Q)
-0.191627*
-0.108333*
(0.119279)
(0.060767)

Shariah_ dummy

0.189301**
(0.089332)

0.291484***
(0.050149)

ICRG

0.002307*
(0.001486)

0.003260***
(0.000760)

-0.002338 **
(0.001103)

-0.002112***
(0.000620)

0.018062***
(0.001857)

0.011809***
(0.000925)

Inflation

-0.008820***
(0.002462)

-0.008858***
(0.001100)

Interest_ rate

-0.009152***
(0.001615)

-0.001300*
(0.000913)

Asset_ growth

0.001102***
(3.03E-05)

0.000243***
(1.93E-05)

Dividend_ payout

0.000667***
(0.000178)

0.000849***
(9.65E-05)

Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah

GDP

Observations

52362
48111
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following equation
𝛽0 + +𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +
𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ+ 𝛽8Dividend_ payout
+E𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q)
alternatively.
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Appendix 3

Table (18)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.391144***
(0.002405)

Elections_ dummy

-0.012161**
(0.005140)
13471

Observations

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)

Table (19)

Constant

0.391197***
(0.002404)

Elections_ dummy

-0.006845*
(0.005388)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.054275***
(0.016562)
13471

Observations

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.362086***
(0.003213)

Table (20)

Constant

Shariah _ dummy

0.061741***
(0.005362)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.075213***
(0.015755)
13471

Observations

(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)

49

Table (21)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.398630***
(0.010533)

Shariah _ dummy

0.062987***
(0.005370)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.081320***
(0.015835)

GDP

-0.016262***
(0.004464)

Observations
13471
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Table (22)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.489414***
(0.013877)

Shariah _ dummy

0.057582***
(0.005375)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.085507***
(0.015773)

GDP

-0.032656***
(0.004738)

Inflation

-0.029145***
(0.002917)

Observations
13471
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Table (23)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
0.487516***
(0.013868)

Shariah _ dummy

0.057862***
(0.005368)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.084285***
(0.015756)

GDP

-0.032830***
(0.004732)

Inflation

-0.029575***
(0.002915)

Asset_ growth

0.000219***
(4.82E-05)

Observations
13468
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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Table (24)

Constant

Dependent Variable
Measures of Financial Performance
(1)
Log (Tobin’s Q)
1.556868***
(0.070074)

Shariah _ dummy

0.045062***
(0.005376)

Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah

-0.083588***
(0.015592)

GDP

-0.023935***
(0.004718)

Inflation

-0.030447***
(0.002885)

Asset_ growth

0.000393***
(4.90E-05)

Size

-0.189444***
(0.012174)

Observations
13468
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error.
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively
The above regression was conducted using the following
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)
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